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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3(2)(n) Utah Code Annotated, as amended, and Rule 3(a), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The trial court was correct in ruling that Maria 's evidence failed to

demonstrate that the costs of private school and a car for the parties' minor child
were reasonablely necessary expenses sufficient to set child support above the top
guideline.
Standard of Review. The amount of child support set by the trial court is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. BaJ] v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah App. 1996).
Issue Preserved. This point is in Monte's capacity as Appellee, and as such,
Maria has preserved it. In addition, Monte presented the trial court with his
supporting case law of Reinhartv. Reinhart. 963 P.2d 757 (Utah App. 1998) and
Ball v. Peterson. 912 P. 2d 1006 (Utah App. 1996) during opening argument. Tr. pp.
7-8..R., p.201.
2.

The trial court was correct in ruling that Maria failed to show a basis for

modifying the allocation of the child tax exemption claim
Standard of Review. A denial of a modification of a child support type
provision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ball v. Peterson. 912 P. 2d 1006
(Utah App. 1996).
Issue Preserved. This point is in Monte's capacity as Appellee and, as such,
Maria has preserved it.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the trial court's denial of Maria's Verified Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce, filed March 3,2005. An Order To Show Cause Hearing was held
on April 11, 2005, at which the parties stipulated to a temporary increase in Monte's
child support obligation from $637 per month to $826 per month. This was not based
on any income figure for the parties- rather, it was by stipulation.
On September 25, 2006, the matter was tried to the Honorable Ernie W.
Jones, District Judge. Judge Jones denied Maria's request to increase Monte's child
support obligation beyond the previously stipulated $826 per month, and in general,
denied Maria all relief for which she had prayed, in the Judge's Memorandum
Decision dated October 5, 2006.
An Order on Respondent's Petition To Modify Child Support Provisions of
Decree of Divorce was entered on December 5, 2006. Maria filed her Notice of
Appeal on December 26, 2006.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

The parties were divorced January 3, 1991. Judgment and Decree of

Divorce, Rat pp. 1-3. In the Decree, Maria was awarded custody of their minor child,
Casey Jordan Bambrough born March, 1990 and Monte was ordered to pay child
support of $350 per month. Decree, paragraphs #3 and 10, R. pp. 2-3.
2.

On July 7, 1998, the parties, through counsel, stipulated to a child

support increase to $637 per month, based upon Maria's then imputed income of
$1000 per month gross, and Monte's then actual income of $6901 per month gross.
Stipulated Order, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7; R. pp. 21-22. The parties' combined
2

incomes were still within the child support guideline limits.
3.

On March 3, 2005, Maria filed a Verified Petition To Modify Decree of

Divorce. R., pp. 28-34. She basically sought to increase Monte's child support
obligation from $637 per month to $2500 per month, based on two main alleged
changes in circumstances: (1) that Monte was averaging $20,123.45 per month
gross income, Petition To Modify, paragraph #7;R.p. 29; and (2) that Casey now
had increased reasonable expenses because she was attending private high school
at Xavier College Preparatory Academy. Petition To Modify , paragraph #11; R., p.
30. She also asked for Monte to pay for one half of any expenses relating to
providing Casey with a car and car insurance, not to exceed $500 per month, once
Casey reached 16 years of age (Casey was not quite 15 when Maria filed the
present Petition To Modify and not even driving yet). Petition To Modify, paragraph
(f); R-, P-33.
4.

Casey was a straight A student in public school in the 8th and 9th

grades. Maria's testimony, Tr. p.52 lines 19-25 R., p. 201;. Monte's Trial Exhibit
#1 ,R.p 200. Maria's decision to move Casey from the public schools to an extremely
expensive private school was based purely on Maria's feelings and not on its being
necessary. Maria's Testimony, Tr. pp. 52-55; R., p.201.
5.

Casey could have walked to her public high school, taken the bus or

Maria could have driven her, as it was only one and a half miles from their home.
Maria's Testimony Tr. p. 56, line 25 - p. 57, line 22; R., p. 201. Maria's decision to
purchase a car for Casey's transportation was solely due to her unilateral decision
to send her to the costly private school, which was 22 miles from home. Maria's
3

Testimony, Tr. p. 56 line 22 - p. 57 , line 22; R., p.201. Maria did not even purchase
the car until August, 2006, some 17 months after she filed the present modification
proceedings. Maria's Testimony, Tr. page 62, line 10 - line 24; R., p.201.
6.

At trial, other than testifying to the cost of private school and car

expenses, Maria presented no evidence of Casey's reasonable needs- no evidence
concerning the costs of housing, food, clothing, extracurricular activities, hobbies,
medical, dental or other health-related expenses. Instead, in direct response to
Judge Jones's question as to how she came up with a child support figure of $2500
per month, she indicated it was "...[bjased pretty much on a percentage of... Mr.
Bambrough's monthly income..." Tr. p. 105, line 21- p.106, line 4; R., p.201.
7.

Casey turns 18 in March, 2008, and her high school class graduates in

May, 2008. Maria's Testimony TR. p.55, lines 12-16; R.,p. 201. The additional
classes Casey takes are not necessary for her high school diploma, and are just
early college classes. Maria's Testimony, Tr. p. 55, line 23 - p.56, line 3; R., p. 201.
8.

Judge Jones found that Monte's gross income was $15,739 per

month, and that Maria's average for 2001-2005 was $3795 per month. Memorandum
Decision, paragraphs #2-4; R.,p.169. At the time of trial, Maria was only earning
$1733 per month gross. Maria's Testimony, Tr.p.50, lines 4-10.
9.

Judge Jones also found that the evidence presented did not establish

an increase in reasonable needs for Casey or that Casey needed to be in private
school, or that a car was a necessary expense for her. Memorandum Decision,
R.p.170.0.

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 78-45-7.12, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, states that
when the parties' adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level in the Base
Combined Child Support Obligation Table (Section 78-45-7.14), an appropriate and
just child support amount shall be ordered on a case-by-case basis, not to be less
than the highest level specified in the table. In the case of one child, that amount is
$826 per month - the amount ordered by the trial court in this case. To go above
that top guideline amount, the trial court must make findings on a child's reasonable
needs and all appropriate and just factors. Ball v. Peterson. 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah
App. 1996).
Maria advocates the applicability of Section 78-45-7(3), Utah Code Annotated,
as amended. That Section applies only when there has been introduced sufficient
evidence to rebut the guidelines, which implies that the parties' incomes are within
the guidelines. Otherwise, the trial court's decision is to be on a case-by-case basis
pursuant to Section 78-45-7.12. Baker v Baker. 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993),
with no mandatory listing of criteria.
The main thrust of Maria's argument is that Casey's expenses of private
school and a car are necessary, and that she (Maria) need not have presented any
other evidence of Casey's reasonable needs (such as housing, food, clothing,
extracurricular activities/hobbies, medical, dental or other health-related expenses)rather she needed only to show Monte's income. Judge Jones's finding that Maria
simply opted to place Casey in a private school, but that there was no evidence
5

presented that she needed to be in a private school, because she did well in the
public school, supports his determination that the private school was not a
reasonable need. See Statement of Facts #4, this Brief. Maria does not challenge
that finding, but rather, merely points to other evidence that supports her view that
private school was a reasonable need. Judge Jones did not abuse his discretion in
finding that it was not reasonably necessary. Bail v. Peterson, supra. Similarly Judge
Jones's finding that a car was not a necessary expense for Casey was supported
by the evidence and not an abuse of his discretion. See Statement of Facts #5, this
Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
SETTING CHILD SUPPORT AT THE TOP GUIDELINE
AMOUNT OF $826 PER MONTH.

Section 78-45-7.12, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, provides:
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate and just
child support amount shall be ordered on a case-by case
basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the
highest level specified in the table for the number of
children due support.
To go above the top guideline amount, the trial court must make findings on a child's
reasonable needs and all appropriate and just factors. BaN v. Peterson, 912 P.2d
1006 (Utah App. 1996).
The main thrust of Maria's argument is that Casey's private school costs and
car costs are necessary expenses, and that she (Maria) need not have presented
6

any other evidence of Casey's reasonable needs, e.g., housing, food, clothing,
extracurricular activities/hobbies, medical, dental, or other health-related expenses.
Rather, she only needed to show Monte's gross income and take a percentage of
that. See Statement of Facts #6., this Brief. Judge Jones rejected this argument,
finding that the evidence did not show that Casey needed to be in private school,
because she had done well in public school, nor did the evidence show that a car
was a necessary expense for Casey. These findings are supported by the evidence.
See Statement of Facts, #4 and 5, this Brief.
The setting of child support is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial
court. Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) and this is so even when the
parties' combined gross monthly incomes are in excess of the guideline table set
forth in Section 78-45-7.14, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. Bail v. Peterson.
912 P.2d1006. (Utah App. 1996). In addition, in child support cases where parental
income exceeds the guidelines, the parties must introduce evidence to establish the
reasonable needs of a child, and a demonstration of an increase in the obligor's
income alone is not sufficient. Reinhart v. Reinhart. 963 P.2d 757 (Utah App. 1998).
In the present case, Judge Jones found that the school costs and car costs
were not necessary, based on the evidence. Maria does not challenge these
findings, but instead points to other evidence she presented- basically that in her
opinion, these are necessary expenses. However, it is incumbent upon Maria to
demonstrate that Judge Jones's finding was not supported by the evidence and she
has not done so.
7

Rather, Maria contends that Judge Jones erred by not considering evidence
she entered, or tried to enter, under Section 78-45-7(3), Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, citing Baker v. Baker. 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993). However, the Baker
holding itself makes it clear that this section only applies to cases where the parties'
incomes are within the guideline amounts, and the guidelines are then rebutted.
In Baker, the father's income alone $150,120 per year, an amount exceeding
the statutory guideline amounts. The trial court set support for the children at $1600.
per month, higher than the top guideline amount for two children of $1400 per
month. On appeal, Mrs. Baker contended that the trial court, in determining an
appropriate and just child support amount under Section 78-45-7.12 (above the
guideline incomes) must consider all the factors set forth in Section 78-45-7(3)
(rebutting the guidelines), just as Maria argues in her Brief.
The Court of Appeals rejected this very holding:
... However, by the very language of that section [7845-7(3)], a trial court need consider these
enumerated factors only when there is sufficient
evidence to rebut the guidelines set forth in section
78-45-7.14. In the case at bar, since the award of
child support was beyond the amount listed in the
statutory guidelines, neither party's proposed award
even addressed, much less rebutted the guidelines.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in declining to
address the factors listed in section 78-45-7(3). 866
P.2d 540, at 545.
Thus, Section 78-45-7(3) applies only in cases where the parties' combined
incomes are within the guidelines and one of the parties seeks to rebut their
applicability. That is not the case here. Maria's argument that she was prevented
8

form presenting evidence under this section fails, because the section does not
apply. She had to prove that the amount of child support sought was for the
reasonably necessary expense of Casey's support. This she did not do. Not only did
she not persuade the trial court under Section 78-45-7.12, but her argument that the
guideline rebuttal criteria of Section 78-45-7(3) apply is not supported by the case
law.
In addition, Maria argued at trial that she was entitled to an increase based on
a percentage of Monte's income , see Statement of Facts #6, this Brief. Such a
position is analogous to the linear extrapolation prohibited by Bali v Peterson
("...Strict reliance on linear extrapolation would be erroneous, because taken to the
extreme, a child could be awarded support vastly exceeding any reasonable need."
Ball v. Peterson. 912 P.2d 1006, at 1014.)
Maria's citation of Jeffries v. Jeffries. 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1998) is
inapposite, because Jeffries was a pre-guideline case decided in 1988, and the
guidelines apply only to cases establishing or modifying child support on or after July
1,1989. Section 78-45-7.2(1), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. Her citation to Hill
v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992) is also distinguishable, because the Hjii
holding relied on Jeffries, a pre-guideline case. The HNI income figures were also
clearly within the guideline amounts.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT
MARIA FAILED TO SHOW A BASIS FOR MODIFYING
THE ALLOCATION OF THE CHILD TAX EXEMPTION
CLAIM.

Maria argues that, under Section 78-47.21, Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, she is entitled to modify the divorce decree's allocation of the child tax
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exemption claim entitlement, because she pays so much of Casey's expenses,
arguing that this is a change in circumstances. She does not mention that she only
earns $1733 per month gross currently because she changed jobs. Maria's
Testimony, Tr. p.50, lines 4-10. She also presented no analysis to the trial court of
how much asserting the tax exemption claim was worth to her as compared to what
it was worth to Monte, Section 78-45-7.21 (2)(b); what the parties' circumstances
were when the Decree was entered originally; or any other evidence that there has
been a material and substantial change in circumstances. Judge Jones was
therefore correct in ruling that Maria failed to show a basis for modifying the
allocation of the child tax exemption claim.
CONCLUSION
The trail court was within the sound exercise of its discretion when it ruled that
Maria failed to prove that either an expensive private school or a car expense in the
future, was necessary for Casey's support. Judge Jones followed correctly the
requirements of Section 78-45-7.12 when he modified the previous child support
award, setting it at the top guideline amount.
Marie also requests that the case be remanded for further findings and
evidence. She is not entitled to that relief. Judge Jones's decision should be
affirmed, with no attorney fee award.
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